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In The Supreme Court.·
of the State of Utah
JACKIE LEE SYDDALL,

Appellant,

- vs. JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
10950
-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Jackie Lee Syddall, appeals from
the denial of his petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant filed his petition for a writ of
Habeas Corpus in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County. A hearing was held on March 10th, 1967, before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge presiding. Appellant was present in person and by counsel. Testi-
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mony was taken. The court at the conclusion of the.
hearing took the matter under advisement. On April i
13th, 1967, the court having found no evidence of
any injustice to the appellant in the original pro-,
ceeding entered an order denying the writ ol
Habeas Corpus.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 25th, 1955, the appellant was
convicted of the crimes of burglary in the second ·
degree and grand larceny. He was sentenced to the
Utah State Prison for a term of one to twenty years
on the burglary charge and a term of one to ten
years on the larceny charge the sentences to run
concurrently.
The defendant was arrested in connection with
a burglary of the Junior High School at Monroe, I
Utah, on September 15th, 1955. The exact date ol
appellant's incarceration is in dispute. However, i!
seems clear from the record that a complaint charg
ing him with the crimes of which he was subsequen1·
ly convicted was issued from the Juvenile Court ol;
the Fourth Juvenile District on October 8th, 19~5 •
(Ex. D-1). A hearing was held in the juvenile couri
on October 10th, 1955 (Ex. D-2). The defendant was
advised at that time that the Juvenile Court nf thP

Fourth Juvenile District and the District Court for
the Sixth Judicial District had concurrent jurisdiction over him. Evidence was then taken with
regard to the offense charged. The arresting officer,
Rex Huntsman, gave testimony. As a result of this
hearing, the court determined that the matter should
be trans£erred to the District Court for the Sixth
Judicial District in and for the County of Sevier as
provided by Utah Laws 1931, Ch. 29, § 27. The defendant was advised that he may have a preliminary
hearing and was advised of the nature and substance of the preliminary examination. The matter
was ordered trans£erred to the district court (Ex. D-2).
On October 11th, 1955, the transcript of docket
and all the papers in the juvenile court were transmitted to the Sixth Judicial District Court (Ex. D-2}.
Defendant was charged in the District Court of the
Sixth Judicial District in and for Sevier County,
by an information filed October 17th, 1955 (Ex. D-5).
The following facts appear from the certified copies
of the minute entries of the District Court of the Sixth
Judicial District in and for Sevier County, State of
Utah: On October 19th, 1955, the defendant appeared before the court without counsel for arraignment.
Sterling R. Bossard was the district attorney appearing for the State of Utah. The defendant waived his
right to have counsel appointed. The information
was read to the defendant and he entered a plea of
::ruilty. The court postponed pronouncement of
Judgment until November 7th, 1955, and in the
meantime stated it would refer the matter to the
State Board of Adult Probation and Parole for in-
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vestigation. On October 24th, 1955, the de±endani,
appeared before the court again for arraignment.
This time, however, he was represented by his
counsel, J. Vernon Erickson. Apparently so as no!
to prejudice the defendant, the court allowed a
second arraignment in this matter, and appointed J. ·
Vernon Erickson as his counsel. The matter was
continued at the request of the defense counsel so
that counsel could confer with the defendant. The
defendant appeared before the court a second time
on October 24th, 1955, represented by his court
appointed counsel, J. Vernon Erickson, for entry ol
a plea. The information was read to the defendarn
and he plead not guilty. The tentative time for trial
was fixed at November 7th, 1955, On November 7th,
1955, the defendant appeared before the court represented by his counsel and the matter was set for
trial beginning December 5th, 1955. On November
8th, 1955, the defendant again appeared with courts.el and changed his plea from not guilty to guilty.
The pronouncement of judgment was continued
until November 21st, 1955. On November 25th, 1955,
Jackie Lee Syddall was committed to the Utah Stata
Prison by the Honorable John L. Sevy Jr., Judge ol
the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and
f~r the County of Sevier, State of Utah (Ex. D-9).
The records further show that the warrant was
issued October 8th, 1955, and served on October
10th, 1955 (Ex. P-10). The appellant himself was not
sure of exactly what day he was put in jail (R. 42), bu 1
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, the sheriff's records show that he was jailed October
7th, 1955 (Ex. P-10). Respondent submits that the foregoing statement of facts is more in keeping with the
actual state of the records and more nearly follows
the rule that on appeal in habeas corpus the evidence will be viewed in a light most favorable to the
respondent. Other pertinent facts will be mentioned
in the argument portion of this brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S ARREST AND DETENTION PRIOR
TO CONVICTION DID IN NO WAY DEPRIVE HIM OF
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS.

Appellant apparently is arguing that his alleged
arrest on September 15th, 1955, and subsequent detention until October 8th, 1955, deprived him of
certain rights deemed to be protected under the
heading of due process. Respondent submits in the
first instance that appellant was not arrested for the
crimes charged on September 15th. In fact, the crime
charged was committed on September 15th. However, it is clear from appellant's testimony at the
hearing that he alleges that he was in jail prior to
and after September 15th, 1955. Respondent submits that appellant had been in and out of the jail
during the period in question for numerous other
charges. On cross-examination, the plaintiff stated:
Q. (By Mr. Gundry) I ask you if you were arrested on the Fifteenth day of September, 1955,
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ctnd placed in the Sevier County Jail.
A. That is the time the warrant of arrest came
down. I was in jail prior to the Fifteenth of September.

Q. You were in jail prior to the Fifteenth of
September, is that your testimony today under
oath? I want you to consider your testimony
very carefully.

A. Yes; I was in jail before the Fifteenth day of ·
September.

* * * *
Q. (By Mr. Gundry) Was there any other case
you were charged by Sheriff Huntsman with
second degree burglary and grand larceny?

A. You told me when you started to question
me I was arrested on the Fifteenth.

Q. Answer my question, was there another
occasion when you were arrested by Sheriff
Huntsman, any occasions?
A.

Yes.

Q.

On suspicion of those crimes?

A.

Yes.

Then Mr. Gundry asked if Exhibit 1, which was '
the complaint. did evince the true date of the charge
ag a.inst him.
A. (By Mr. Syddall) I can't truthfully say what
day it was, what day.
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Q. The fact of the matter is, Mr. Syddall, you
don't remember when you were put in jail, do
you?

A.

The exact day, no, I can't remember.

Obviously you weren't in jail charged with
this crime before the crime was committed, you
wouldn't want this court to believe that, would
you?
Q.

A. I'm not sure it was the Fifteenth of September.
Q. Well, how much prior to the Eighth of October was it when you were charged in juvenile
court?

A.

I don't remember the exact date.

Q. I want you to think very carefully, was it
more than three weeks prior?

A.

Approximately three weeks.

Approximately three weeks prior. Did you
have any trouble with the law at that time, Mr.
Syddall? Did you get arrested for anything
else?
Q.

* * * *
A. We were all picked up. There was four
people and myself that was picked up. I wasn't
arrested for anything. I was taken in and talked
to on one of these nights.
But in this period of time approximately
three weeks prior to the Eighth of October, until
Q.
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the Eighth of October, in fact, until you were
committed, you were in jail all during that time?
A.

Jail?

Were you in jail all during the time, three
weeks prior to the Eighth of October until you
were committed?
Q.

A. There could have been three or four days
between.

* * * *

Isn't it a fact that you were arrested for
public intoxication on the Sixth of October?
Q.

A.

I was arrested for public intoxication?

Q.

Yes.

A. I remember that Mr. Reed Farnum, in my
company, was arrested for public intoxication,
yes.
Q.

That was on the Sixth of October?

A.

I don't remember.

(R. 40, 41, 42, 43, 53, 54, 55).

From the foregoing it is clear that in the appellant's mind the exact date on which he was arrested
is definitely in doubt. However, the arresting officer,
Sheriff Huntsman, was examined by appellant's
counsel, Mr. Robert B. Hansen, at the hearing.
Sheriff Huntsman testified as follows:
(By Mr. Hansen) Now, can you tell us,
Sheriff, what day Mr. Syddall was first brought

Q.

to the Richfield Jail as a result of this matter m
1955?

A. Yes sir.
Q.

And can you tell us what day that was?

A. We keep a record, a master file, of when
they are jailed and what happens here. Now,
do you want me to read this?
Q.

Would you, please?

A. It says: "Jackie Lee Syddall jailed 10-7-55:
warrant issued October 8; warrant served October 10."
Thus, petitioner's contention that he was detained from September 15th, through October 8th,
the time of which the warrant issued, is conclusively
rebutted by the record. However, assuming that
such detention was unwarranted or illegal, the detention is not prejudicial if subsequent proceedings
are adequate to protect the right of the accused.
Osbourne v. Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949).
An illegal detention of a defendant is prejudicial
only if the detention in some way influences the
plea. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 {1948); Trowbridge v. Pennsylvania, 112 F. Supp. 356 (1952), affirmed, 204 F.2d 689 (1953); Commonwealth v. Keenan, 170 Pa. Super 282, 85 A.2d 678 (1952); Zell v.
Warden. Md. House of Corrections. 191 Md. 745, 59
A.2d 737 (1948).
In the instant case, it is clear that no prejudice
would have resulted even if appellant was detained
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he alleges. Subsequent to his alleged confinement, appellant had counsel present, entered a ple,-1
of not guilty, and then with counsel, changed hi;
plea to guilty. Therefore, any prejudice resulting
from the alleged illegal detention prior to the charge
is wholly vitiated.
cts

POINT II
THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS SUFFICIENT TO
ADEQUATELY DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE
PROCEEDINGS IN QUESTION.

Appellant's second argument is extremely
vague. However, it seems that he is attempting to
complain about the loss of certain records. Respondent submits that the record before this court clearly
shows the proceedings in the juvenile court, the
subsequent transfer to the district court, and the ultimate conviction on a plea of guilty taken in the district court.
Appellant frivolously asks this court to assume
that "lost records" would show certain facts which
prejudiced him. He makes no allegation of prejudice. He merely asserts the bare speculation that
somewhere there may be evidence of prejudicial
treatment. This he asks the court to assume in the
face of the statement on page 13 of his brief that
"The only evidence, if any, ever introduced in any
court was the testimony of Rex Huntsman, Sheriff,
taken on the Tenth day of October in the juvenile
court."
The appellant did not complain of any "losi
records" in his petition for the writ of Habeas
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Corpus. Nor is there any evidence in the transcript
of the proceedings at the hearing to indicate that
the appellant was asserting the alleged loss of records as a ground for his release on Habeas Corpus.
The law is well settled that grounds for Habeas Corpus cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal.
Washington v. Turner, 17 Utah2d 361, 412 P.2d 449
(1966). Thus, it is clear that appellant's second argument has no merit for both of the foregoing reasons.
POINT III
THE RECORD CLEARLY SHOWS THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED LEGAL COUNSEL AT THE
TIME OF ENTERING HIS PLEA OF GUILTY; AND
FURTHER, THAT APPELLANT WAS ADEQUATELY
ADVISED BY COUNSEL AT ALL CRITICAL POINTS
IN THE PROCEEDINGS.

Appellant is apparently making the argument
that he did not have the advice of counsel durinq
the period between October 8th, and the date
on which he was sentenced to the Utah State
Prison. In the light of the record and the minute entries that are exhibits herein, it is clear that appellant
was, in fact, represented by J. Vernon Erickson.
After the transfer of appellant's case from the juvenile court to the district court, he was arraigned without counsel. Subsequently, either his mother or the
court or someone got in touch with Mr. Erickson,
and the court appointed Mr. Erickson as counsel for
the defendant on October 24th, 1955. Prior to October 24th, the appellant had apparently been standinq on his plea of quilty. Subsequent to October
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24th, the plea was changed, apparently on the advice of counsel, from guilty to not guilty. The case '
was continued to allow time for counsel to consult
with the defendant. Then on November 8th, the defendant again appeared with counsel and changed
his plea from not guilty to guilty.
In the light of these facts, clearly established by
the record, it is difficult for respondent to see how
appellant can allege that he was without counsel.
That counsel was provided is beyond dispute.
Appellant also apparently would make the
argument that he suffered detriment from the fact
that he waived preliminary hearing without the
benefit of counsel. Respondent submits that this
argument has no merit. In McGuffey v. Turner, 18
Utah 2d 354, 356, 423 P.2d. 166, 167 (1967), the court
stated:
It is rather difficult to see how a guilty defendant is prejudiced by waiving a preliminary
hearing when all that is entailed at the hearing is
that sufficient evidence be given to the committing
magistrate to cause him to believe that a crime has
been committed and that there is probable cause
to believe the defendant guilty thereof.

In light of petitioner's subsequent plea of guilty,
it is difficult to conceive how he could have been
harmed by a waiver of preliminary hearing.
Respondent submits that the fact that he did not
have counsel at the time of waiving the preliminary
hearing did in no way prejudice him or infringe
upon any of his rights. State v. Seymour. 18 Utah

,
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2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966). In the Seymour case, it
was stated, 18 Utah 2d. at 156, 417 P.2d. at 657:
The processes of law have only one legitimate
objective: To seek out truth and do justice. It does
not serve this objective nor does it comport with
our sense of justice, to regard the proceeding as a
game of tricks in which the defendant goes free
merely because there is some error or deficiency
which reason dictat.es would have no materi81 bearing upon the fairness of the proceedings or its outcome. [Emphasis added.]

Respondent submits that in this case appellant
has been accorded every fairness, every opportunity, and every consideration by the court, by the
prosecutor, by his counsel, and everyone concerned with the matter from the initial stages. The record
shows that the individual here in question has had
numerous difficulties in adjusting to society. He was
in the State Industrial School at eleven (R. 76); he
was back in the Industrial School on numerous occasions since that time (R. 37); he admitted that he
was probably on parole from the Industrial School
at the time he was arrested for the offense charged
(R. 42, 43); he has been convicted of at least one
felony since the conviction we are concerned with
here (Ex. D-11).
With this record, the petitioner comes crying
into this court that he was a seventeen-year-old
youth and his rights were not protected. The evidence shows just the opposite: that he was given
every consideration; that he has been a problem
child since the age of eleven; that he has been un-
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able to adjust to society; and that there is great
doubt as to the veracity of any of the statements he
has made both in his petition and his brief filed in
this court. The State of Utah also has an interest in
the fair dealing and fair play in this matter. McGuf.
fey v. Tumer, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967);
State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966).
Gallegos v. Tumer, 17 Utah 2d 273, 409 P.2d 386
(1965); Ward v. Tumer, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 72
(1961) (concurring opinion).
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that all appellant's contentions are without merit. In fact, his allegations are
so frivolous that they hardly warrant consideration.
It is the opinion of respondent that this attempt to
gain freedom by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is a clear abuse of that important and fundamental protection in our system of justice.
In view of this record, wholly void of any semblance of support for petitioner's unwarranted and
unfounded allegations, the respondent can oniy
urge and trust that this court will affirm the decision
of the trial court.
ResPectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN

Attorney General

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City. Utah

